The Concept of Race in International Criminal Law by Lingaas, Carola
The Concept of Race in International Criminal Law 
The Nazis defined the Jews as a race inferior to the Aryan race, the Khmer Rouge identified the 
‘new people’ as enemies with a biologically dissimilar essence, and in Darfur (Sudan), the 
Janjaweed militia labelled their enemies derogatorily as ‘Zourga’, or black Africans. 
Seemingly, these victim classifications all have a racial denominator in common. Yet, how does 
international criminal law in general and the law of genocide in particular define race? Is it even 
possible to define race? 
In its early years, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) interpreted the 
protected groups of genocide, including the racial group, in a purely objective manner. In doing 
so, the tribunal disrespected two important facts: first, according to natural sciences, humankind 
cannot be meaningfully divided into objectively/biologically distinct races. Second, the process 
leading up to a genocide is symptomatically subjective: in the perpetrator’s eyes, the victim 
group is immutably different from the perpetrator’s ostensibly superior group. In this process 
of so-called ‘othering’, a dichotomy between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is created. The marginalized 
‘other’ group can, notably, have an imagined identity, entirely dependent on the perpetrator’s 
perceptions. As such, the victim group ought to be constructed purely subjectively, based upon 
the perpetrator’s understanding of the victims’ (racial) otherness. 
1. Race in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunals 
The ICTR Akayesu trial judgment of 1998 was the first ever conviction for the crime of 
genocide by an international criminal tribunal. “The conventional definition of racial group,” 
Akayesu held, “is based on the hereditary physical traits often identified with a geographical 
region, irrespective of linguistic, cultural, national or religious factors” (see para. 514). The 
Trial Chamber did not provide any supporting evidence, legal or extra-legal, to substantiate this 
definition. The reference to ‘hereditary physical traits’ implies an objective approach to a 
scientifically highly disputed method, namely the identification of people by means of their 
physical appearance, such as their skin color. Hereditary is defined as “genetically transmitted 
or transmittable from parent to offspring”. Defining race as the genetic transmission of physical 
traits is not only scientifically wrong, it also preserves outdated and contentious methods of 
classifying people. 
Later judgments of the different international criminal tribunals and courts have gradually 
moved away from the objective definition of the Akayesu trial judgment. Yet, they have never 
fully endorsed a subjective, perpetrator-based approach to defining the protected groups of 
genocide. Thereby, they fail to recognize the inherent subjectivity of a (pre-)genocidal process. 
Rather than attempting to objectively construct distinct racial groups for the purpose of 
international criminal law, judges should consider the perpetrator’s inner thoughts. The legal 
requirement of “the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a (…) racial group, as such” (Art. 2 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; verbatim definition 
in the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court), 
connects the perpetrator’s intent with the victim group definition. Thus, the proof of the 
perpetrator’s dolus specialis comprises the definition of the protected racial group. 
2. Legal Objectivity vs. Subjective Classification 
Notions like ‘race’ are difficult to grasp because they are social constructs rather than objective, 
verifiable facts. Since much of our (legal) worldview depends on understanding objectivity, the 
contrast between such objective and subjective realities is further exacerbated. The law of 
genocide puts four categories at the disposal of the courts: the national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group. Each category is an analytical tool, which they can use to extrapolate to 
individual victims the purported characteristic of an imagined archetypal ‘racial’ group 
member. However, the assignment of victims to one of the four groups cannot signify that they 
exist in reality, but rather that the perpetrators – and consequently the judges – assume they do. 
The legal classification is treated as a reality, although it actually originates in the perception 
of the perpetrator. Thus, rather than looking for an objective legal reality of ‘race’, the victim 
group’s imagined identity based on the perpetrator’s perception should be the point of departure 
for a legal classification of the victims. 
3. The Legal Relevance of Othering 
Prior to any genocide, commonalities between ‘us’ and ‘them’ are removed. Instead, 
dissimilarities are enhanced, often by means of communication, to the point where the 
perpetrator calls for the extermination of the ‘others’. Communication is here understood 
broadly to include any kind of utterances by the perpetrator that reveal his perception of the 
victim group. While social sciences have long recognized the importance of the process of 
othering, in which a group of ‘others’ is identified, stigmatized, discriminated, and finally 
dehumanized, it is rarely discussed in judgments or legal scholarship. 
Dehumanization is inherent to any genocidal process and abolishes all humanness from the 
victims, who therefore are not one of ‘us’. Dehumanization is a belief, a way of thinking, 
according to which some human beings only give the impression of being human. Beneath the 
surface, however, they are not human after all. Thus, albeit having a human appearance, these 
dehumanized beings, in the understanding of the perpetrator, consist of an inhuman essence or, 
put differently, of a racial otherness. Indeed, research suggests that biologically grounded race-
thinking is present prior to any instance of mass atrocity (see e.g. Paul Taylor, p. 8; David 
Livingstone Smith, p. 163, Nigel Eltringham, pp. 5-12; Stephan Cornell and Douglas Hartmann, 
p. 28). It is important to note that the victim group’s dehumanization alone will not lead to 
genocide. Rather, the mortal threat the victims’ out-group allegedly presents to the perpetrator’s 
in-group is what ultimately distinguishes genocide from other discrimination or inhumane 
treatment.  
Commonly, the perpetrators distinguish their victims by some stigma or myth and refer to them 
by humiliating metaphors, a treatment they believe to be fully justified. Such ideology is then 
spread by propaganda that defines the victim as outside the pale of human existence and 
therefore susceptible to attack. The vital communication aspect by which ‘the others’ are first 
identified, portrayed as a ubiquitous threat and then targeted as victims of genocide, is 
acknowledged by several scholars. 
Degrading epithets like cockroach, maggot, savages, vermin, and disease (cancer, plague) deny 
the victims’ humanity. The dehumanization of the victim group is usually necessary for the 
perpetrator to overcome the typical human disgust against the violence. In a genocide trial, 
dehumanizing communication in the shape of speeches, statements, utterances, (written) orders, 
and publications can all become proof of the perpetrator’s dolus specialis. 
4. Conclusion 
International criminal law defines against whom the crime of genocide can be committed and, 
conversely, who faces punishment for committing it. Apart from genocide, international law 
protects members of racial groups also from the crimes against humanity of persecution and 
apartheid. Since ‘race’ is part and parcel of the definition of three international crimes, its 
contemporary legal interpretation and a coherent judicial approach to it remain imperative. 
In sum, what is the definition of race in international criminal law? In my view, race ought to 
be defined by means of a subjective, perpetrator-based approach. The perpetrator’s 
(objectively) observable demeaning and dehumanizing behavior reveals his or her 
understanding of the victims. As such, ‘race’ becomes a matter of proof: if the perpetrator 
perceives the victims as members of a different (and, typically, an inferior) racial group and 
manifests this understanding through his or her behavior, the perpetrator can be found guilty 
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